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Where to set the approval cutoff for a consumer lender: technical document

Both policies run on the same 2015 applicants, and every number is an actual outcome

  1. Define the current policy on booked loans

    The current policy approves the best sub-grades, up to about 85% of the 2015 applicants.

  2. Use the declined group as the check group

    The lender booked loans in the lowest sub-grades too. Each of these loans has a real outcome: default or no default, and the cash it returned.

  3. Compare the two policies on actual outcomes

    The scorecard approves the same number of applicants in a different order. The comparison uses the actual default rate and the realized NPV of the applicants that change sides.

  • The scorecard learns from the loans of 2013–2014 and is tested on the loans of 2015, which it never saw.
  • Grade, sub-grade and interest rate are not inputs to the scorecard, because they are results of the lender's own policy.
  • The current policy is my assumption. The public data shows only booked loans, not the lender's approval rule. The result shows a method and the likely size of the gain. The test on 10% of applications measures the gain against the real policy.

Five tests, with rules set before the analysis

In the notebook, the champion is the current policy and the challenger is the new policy.

TestMeasureResultRulePass
1. Order of riskKS of the scorecard against the sub-grade; gain of the gradient boosting benchmark0.262 against 0.262; +1.5 pointsKS above the sub-grade; benchmark gain below 2 pointsNo
2. LevelMean PD minus actual rate, July–December 2015-0.2 pointsLess than 1 pointYes
3. StabilityPSI of the score; largest feature PSI0.005; 0.057Less than 0.1Yes
4. Business valueApproval at the champion bad rate; swap-set NPV85.7% against 84.5%; +8.3 $MMore approvals and a positive NPVYes
5. ExplainabilityDeclines with three reasons in plain English100%95% or moreYes

Results

Baseline: what did the booked loans give to the lender?

The data is now clean. Before we build a model, we must know the result that the model must beat. Two later steps need a dollar value for each loan. The swap-set (Step 6) compares the loans that each policy approves. The cutoff (Step 7) adds up the NPV of the approved loans. This section calculates that value and shows the baseline.

The data gives the total payments, the date of the last payment and the recoveries of each loan. It does not give each monthly payment. The code makes the monthly cash flows with these rules (as-06):

  • The borrower pays the installment each month until the month of the last payment.
  • The borrower pays the rest of the total payments in the month of the last payment. For a loan that the borrower pays early, this is the prepayment.
  • The recoveries, minus the collection fee, come 12 months after the last payment.

The NPV uses three costs. The cost of funds is 3% for each year (as-01). The servicing cost is 1% of each payment (as-02). The acquisition cost is $300 for each loan (as-03).

The table gives the baseline by issue year: what the booked loans gave to the lender. It contains only booked loans, so it shows the result of the champion policy of Lending Club.

Loans Amount funded ($M) Default rate Interest rate Realized NPV ($M) Realized NPV for each loan
Issue year
2013 100,422 1,272 12.3% 13.4% 42.9 $427
2014 162,570 2,046 13.7% 12.5% 28.8 $177
2015 282,848 3,622 14.9% 11.3% -32.9 −$116

Chart from the notebook

How to read: each bar is the realized NPV of all booked loans of one issue year, after all costs (as-01 to as-03). The labels under the bars give the default rate and the mean interest rate.

So what: the 2015 loans lost money. The default rate went up from 12.3% to 14.9%, and the mean interest rate went down from 13.4% to 11.3%. This is the complication of Step 0 in dollars.

Business note. The model learns from 545,840 clean loans and 65 candidate columns, with four new ratio features. The baseline is clear: the 2013–2014 loans gave a realized NPV of $71.7M, but the 2015 loans gave −$32.9M (−$116 for each loan). Thus the problem has two parts: which applicants to approve (Steps 3–7), and at which price (Part 2: Pricing). Step 3 now splits the data so that the test looks like the future.

Branch 4: business value

The question: at the same risk, does the challenger approve more applicants and add NPV? Two tests answer it.

  • Approval at the champion bad rate. How many applicants can the challenger approve, at the bad rate of the champion?
  • Swap-set. At the same number of approvals, which loans does the challenger change, and are the new loans better?

At the champion bad rate, the challenger approves 85.7% of applicants, against 84.5% for the champion (+1.2 points).

How the swap-set works. The test gives both policies the same number of approvals: the champion approval share of 84.5%. Each 2015 applicant then falls into one of four groups:

Group Champion Challenger Meaning
Both approve Approve Approve No change.
Swap-in Decline Approve New approvals of the challenger.
Swap-out Approve Decline New declines of the challenger.
Both decline Decline Decline No change.

Both policies approve the same number of applicants. Thus the swap-in group and the swap-out group have the same size. Only these two groups change the result.

The champion declines the sub-grades D1 and worse. Lending Club booked all these loans, so we know the real outcome of each swap-in loan. This is a form of reject inference with real outcomes. The limit: the data has no applicant that Lending Club declined. Step 7 examines this limit.

Loans Default rate Interest rate Realized NPV for each loan Total realized NPV ($M)
Group
Both approve 214,716 11.0% 9.9% −$13 -2.9
Swap-in (challenger approves, champion declines) 24,426 23.6% 17.1% −$153 -3.7
Swap-out (champion approves, challenger declines) 24,426 25.1% 12.7% −$493 -12.0
Both decline 19,280 34.2% 17.8% −$741 -14.3

The two policies do not agree on 24,426 loans in each group (8.6% of the 2015 loans). The swap-in loans have a default rate of 23.6%. The swap-out loans have a default rate of 25.1%. With the same number of approvals, the challenger adds $8.3M of realized NPV.

The swap-in loans also have a higher interest rate (17.1% against 12.7%). The challenger finds applicants in lower grades with less risk than their grade shows. Lending Club gave these applicants a high interest rate.

The champion is an assumption (as-04). The table below repeats the approval test for three champion approval rates: 80%, 85% and 90%. For each one, the challenger must reach the bad rate of that champion.

Champion approval Champion bad rate Challenger approval at the same bad rate Gain (points)
80% 75.5% 11.3% 76.8% +1.2
85% 84.5% 12.5% 85.7% +1.2
90% 88.0% 12.9% 88.7% +0.7

The smallest gain of the three champions is +0.7 points. Thus the result does not depend on the exact champion assumption.

Rollout plan

The back-test on the 2015 loans is not proof for the future. The economy, the applicants and the prices change. A controlled test gives the proof before a full rollout. The plan has five parts.

1. Test design. Send a random 10% of applications to the challenger cutoff (rule A). The other 90% stay with the champion. Random allocation makes the two arms equal in all other ways, so the difference comes from the policy. Also approve a small random sample below both cutoffs, as the decision above says.

2. Main KPI. The approval rate of each arm, and its default rate at month 12. The 12-month default rate gives an early estimate of the lifetime default rate (Part 2: Loss forecast). The final KPI is the realized NPV of each arm at month 36.

3. Guardrails. Check these values each month:

  • The PSI of the score, against the 2015 applicants. A value below 0.1 is stable.
  • The mean PD of each monthly vintage against its actual default rate.
  • The approval rate of each arm, against the plan.

4. Kill criteria. Stop the test in either of two cases:

  • The 12-month default rate of the challenger arm is more than 1 point above the champion arm.
  • The PSI of the score is more than 0.25.

5. Top risks.

Risk Effect Control
The true declined applicants are riskier than the booked loans. The approval gain is too high. The test below the cutoff measures their default rate.
The 2015 prices do not pay for the risk. The challenger arm can lose money, also at the same bad rate. The pricing test in Part 2: Pricing.
The applicants change after 2015. The score loses power. The PSI guardrail and the kill criteria.
A complex model can find more risk than the scorecard. The lender approves fewer applicants than it can. Compare the GBM benchmark with the scorecard on each new vintage. Examine the GBM again if it adds 2 KS points or more (Step 4c).

Decision at the end. If the challenger arm keeps the bad rate and adds NPV, roll out the challenger. Use the result of the pricing test to set the final cutoff.

Business note. At the champion bad rate of 12.5%, the challenger approves 85.7% of applicants against 84.5%. It adds $7.1M of realized NPV on the 2015 loans. The gain stays positive for each cost assumption that we tested.

The recommendation is a champion/challenger test on 10% of applications. But the realized NPV of the whole 2015 book is negative, so a better cutoff alone is not enough. Part 2 examines the price, the loss and the recoveries.

What a reviewer should challenge

These limits can change the result most. Each one has a control.

Limitation Effect on the result Control, or what to do next
The data has only booked loans. The champion is an assumption (as-04). The true declined applicants can be riskier. The approval gain can be too high. The test below the cutoff. Step 6 shows three champion approval rates, and the gain stays positive.
The costs are assumptions (as-01, as-03). The NPV can change. The cutoff of the value rule changes much. The sensitivity tables of Step 7 and Part 2: Pricing. The tornado chart in the Excel model.
The expected NPV uses the 2013–2014 economics (as-07). Its level is too high for the 2015 loans. Update the economics with each new vintage. Compare the expected NPV and the realized NPV each quarter.
The 2015 back-test is one period. The economy and the applicants change after 2015. The PSI guardrail and the kill criteria of the rollout plan.
The scorecard adds the effect of each feature, without interactions. The GBM benchmark finds a little more risk: 0.8 more points of approval and $2.3M more NPV on the 2015 loans. Compare the GBM with the scorecard on each new vintage. Examine the GBM again if it adds 2 KS points or more (Step 4c).
Lending Club is not a card portfolio. Line assignment and revolving balances are not in the data. The same method applies with a different target.

Other limits have a small effect. The dates of the cash flows are estimates (as-06), but the totals are actual values. The recoveries of young vintages are not complete. The Excel model uses the mean loan of each policy, so its NPV differs a little from the notebook.

Next steps

  1. Business case deck (6–8 slides): the challenger cutoff with the pricing test as one recommendation.
  2. Model risk review of the scorecard: the table of points, the reason code text and the GBM benchmark.
  3. Design of the pricing test for the grades with a negative NPV, with the method of case 03.
  4. Start the rollout plan of Step 7. It has a champion/challenger test on 10% of applications and a test below the cutoff. It also checks the PSI and the vintage curves each month.

What each tool does in this case

SQLReads the data and filters the 36-month loans, with DuckDB.
PythonRuns the whole analysis in one notebook that gives the same result on each run.
Machine learningScores risk with a scorecard (weight of evidence and logistic regression). Gradient boosting is the benchmark only.
StatisticsValidates on a later period, tests the sensitivity to cost assumptions, and forecasts loss by loan year.
ExcelHolds the P&L model: NPV by policy and the sensitivity chart.